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ABSTRACT
Malware detection is an ever-present challenge for all organiza-
tional gatekeepers. Organizations oen deploy numerous dierent
malware detection tools, and then combine their output to pro-
duce a nal classication for an inspected le. is approach has
two signicant drawbacks. First, it requires large amounts of com-
puting resources and time since every incoming le needs to be
analyzed by all detectors. Secondly, it is dicult to accurately and
dynamically enforce a predened security policy that comports
with the needs of each organization (e.g., how tolerant is the or-
ganization to false negatives and false positives). In this study
we propose ASPIRE, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based method
for malware detection. Our approach receives the organizational
policy – dened solely by the perceived costs of correct/incorrect
classications and of computing resources – and then dynamically
assigns detection tools and sets the detection threshold for each
inspected le. We demonstrate the eectiveness and robustness of
our approach by conducting an extensive evaluation on multiple
organizational policies. ASPIRE performed well in all scenarios,
even achieving near-optimal accuracy of 96.21% (compared to an
optimum of 96.86%) at approximately 20% of the running time of
this baseline.
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tion and malware mitigation; Malware and its mitigation;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Malware detection is an ever-present problem for organizations,
oen with signicant consequences [2]. Specically, Portable Ex-
ecutable (PE) les are one of the most signicant platforms for
malware to spread. PEs are common in the Windows operating
systems, and are used by executables and dynamic link libraries
(DLLs), among others. e PE format is essentially a data structure
which holds all the necessary information for the Windows loader
to execute the wrapped code.
Malware constantly evolve as aackers try to evade detection so-
lutions, the most common of which being the anti-virus. Anti-virus
solutions mostly perform static analysis of the soware’s binary to
detect pre-dened signatures, a trait that renders them ineective
in recognizing new malware even if similar functionality has been
recorded. Moreover, obfuscation techniques such as polymorphism
and metamorphism [33] further exacerbate the problem.
e need to deal with the continuously evolving threats led to
signicant developments in the malware detection eld in recent
years. Instead of searching for pre-dened signatures within the
executable le, new approaches aempt to analyze the behaviour
of the portable executable (PE) le. ese method oen rely on
statistical analysis and machine learning (ML) as their decision
making mechanism, and can generally be thought of as belonging
to one of two families: static analysis and dynamic analysis [18]. In
this study we focus on the static analysis techniques.
Static analysis techniques [29] employ an in-depth look at the le,
without performing any execution. Solutions implementing static
analysis can be either signature-based or statistics-based. Signature-
based detection is the more widely used approach [6] because of
its simplicity, relative speed and its eectiveness against known
malware. Despite these advantages, signature-based detection has
three major drawback: it requires frequent updates of its signature
database, it cannot detect unknown (i.e., zero-day) malware [6],
and it is vulnerable to obfuscation techniques [33].
Statistics-based detection mainly involves the extraction of fea-
tures from the executable, followed by training of a machine learn-
ing classier. e extracted features are varied and may include
executable le format descriptions [19], code descriptions [23], bi-
nary data statistics [17], text strings [5] and information extracted
using code emulation or similar methods [33]. is approach is
considered more eective than its signature-based counterpart in
detecting previously unknown malware – mostly due to its use
of machine learning (ML) [3, 5, 7, 10, 23] – but tends to be less
accurate overall [20]. For this reason, organizations oen deploy
an ensemble of multiple behavioural and statistic detectors, and
then combine their scores to produce a nal classication. is pro-
cess of producing this classication can be achieved through simple
heuristics (e.g., averaging) or by more advanced ML algorithms [12].
Despite its eectiveness, the ensemble approach has two signif-
icant shortcomings. First, using an ensemble requires that orga-
nizations run all participating detection tools prior to classifying
a le. is practice is needed both in order to make scoring con-
sistent and because most ML algorithms (like those oen used to
reach the nal ensemble decision) require a xed-size feature set.
Running all detectors is time and resource intensive and is oen
not necessary for clear-cut cases. is practice results in “wasted”
computing resources. Moreover, the introduction or removal of a
detector oen requires that the entire ML model be retrained, a fact
that limits exibility and the organization’s ability to respond to
new threats.
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e second shortcoming of the ensemble approach is the di-
culty of implementing the organizational security policy. When
using ML-based solutions for malware detection, the only “tool”
available for organizations to set their policy is the nal condence
score: les above a certain score are blocked, while the rest are
allowed in. Under this seing it is dicult to dene the cost of a
false-negative compared to that of a false-positive or to quantify the
cost of running additional detectors. In addition to being hard to
dene, such security policies are also hard to rene: minor changes
to the condence score threshold may result in large uctuations in
performance (e.g., signicantly raising the number of false-alarms).
In this study we propose ASPIRE, a reinforcement learning-based
framework for managing a malware detection platform consisting
of multiple malware detection tools. For each le, our approach
sequentially queries various detectors, deciding aer each step
whether to further analyze the le or produce a nal classication.
ASPIRE’s decision-making process is governed by a pre-dened
reward function that awards points for correct classications and
applies penalties for misclassication and heavy use of computing
resources.
Our approach has two advantages over existing ensemble-based
solutions. First, it is highly ecient, since easy-to-classify les
are likely to only require the use of less-powerful (i.e. ecient)
classiers. We can therefore maintain near-optimal performance
at a fraction of the computing cost. Secondly, organizations can
clearly and deliberately dene and rene their security policy. We
achieve this goal by enabling practitioners to explicitly dene the
costs to each element of the detection process: correct/incorrect
classication and resource usage.
Our contributions in this study are threefold:
• we present a reinforcement learning-based approach for
ensemble-based malware detection. Our approach was able
to achieve near-optimal accuracy of 96.21% (compared to
an optimum of 96.86%) at approximately 20% of the running
time of this baseline.
• we conduct an extensive analysis of multiple security poli-
cies, designed to simulate the needs and goals of a dierent
organizational types. In addition to demonstrating the ro-
bustness of our approach, we analyze the eect of various
policy preferences on detection accuracy and resource use.
• we release the dataset used in our evaluation for general
use. In addition to the les themselves, we release for each
le the condence scores and meta-data of each of the
malware detectors used in our experiments. .
2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section we provide a general overview of deep reinforcement
learning (DRL) algorithms and their advantages. We then elaborate
on our motivation in applying them to eld of malware detection.
2.1 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is an area of machine learning that
addresses decision making in complex scenarios, possibly when
only partial information is available. e ability of RL algorithms to
explore the large solution spaces and devise highly ecient policies
to address them (especially when coupled with deep learning) was
shown to be highly eective in areas such as robotics and control
problems [21], genetic algorithms [26], and achieving super-human
performance in complex games [25].
RL tasks normally consist of both an agent and an environment.
e agent interacts with the environment E in a sequence of actions
and rewards. At each time-step t , the agent selects an action at
from A = {a1,a2, ...,ak } that both modies the state of the envi-
ronment and also incurs a reward rt . Reward can be either positive
or negative1. For each given task (in our case, the classication of a
single le), the goal of the agent is to interact with the environment
in a way that maximizes future rewards Rt =
∑T
t rt where T is the
index of the nal action (i.e., classication decision).
A frequent approach for selecting the action to be taken at each
state is the action-value functionQ(s,a) [27]. e function approxi-
mates the expected returns should we take action a at state s . While
the methods are varied, RL algorithms which use Q-functions aim
to discover (or closely approximate) the optimal action-value func-
tionQ∗ which is dened asQ∗(s,a) = maxpi E[Rt |st = s,at = a,pi ]
where pi is the policy mapping states to actions [27]. Since estimat-
ing Q for every possible state-action combination is highly imprac-
tical [14], it is common to use an approximator Q(s,a;θ ) ≈ Q∗(s,a)
where θ represents the parameters of the approximator. Deep rein-
forcement learning (DRL) algorithm perform this approximation
using neural nets, with θ being the parameters of the network.
While RL algorithms strive to maximize the reward based on
their current knowledge about the world (i.e., exploitation), it is
important to also encourage the exploration of other additional
states. Many methods for maintaining this exploration/exploitation
balance have been oered in the literature, including importance
sampling [22], ϵ-greedy sampling [30] and Monte-Carlo Tree search
[24]. In this study, we use ϵ-greedy sampling.
Actor-critic algorithms for reinforcement learning. Two com-
mon problems in the application of DRL algorithms is the long time
they need to converge due to high variance (i.e., uctuations) in
gradient values, and the need to deal with action sequences with
a cumulative reward of zero (zero reward equals zero gradients,
hence no parameter updates). ese challenges can be addressed
by using actor-critic methods, consisting of a critic neural net that
estimates the Q-function and an actor neural net that updates the
policy according to the critic. e use two separate networks have
been shown to reduce variance and accelerate model convergence
during training. In our experiments we use the actor-critic with ex-
perience replay (ACER) algorithm [32]. Experience replay [13] is a
method for re-introducing the model to previously seen samples in
order to prevent catastrophic forgeing (i.e., forgeing previously
learned scenarios while tackling new ones).
2.2 Motivation
e ever-evolving threat of malware creates an incentive for or-
ganizations to diversify their detection capabilities. As a result,
organizations oen install multiple solutions [11] and run them all
for every incoming le. is approach is both costly – in computing
resources, processing time, and even the cost of electricity – and
oen unnecessary since most les can be easily classied.
1Please note that for convenience we use the term “cost” to describe negative rewards
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A logical solution to this problem would be using a small number
of detectors for clear-cut cases and a larger ensemble for dicult-
to-analyze les. is approach, however, is challenging to imple-
ment for two reasons. e rst challenge is assigning the right
set of detectors for each le. Ideally, we would like this set to be
large enough to be accurate but also as small as possible so it is
computationally-ecient. Striking this balance is by no means a
trivial task, especially when a large number of detectors is available.
e second challenge is the fact that dierent organizations have
dierent preferences when faced with the need to balance detec-
tion accuracy, error-tolerance, and the cost of computing resources.
Using these preference to guide detector selection is an open and
dicult problem.
To the best of our knowledge, every existing ensemble solution
requires running all detectors prior to producing a classication.
is requirement is a result of the supervised learning algorithm
(e.g., SVM, Random Forest) oen used for this purpose. As a result,
not only are existing solution unable to address the rst challenge
we mention, they are also extremely constrained in addressing the
second.
Even aer seing aside the issue of computational cost (which
is moot due to the use of all detectors for each le), striking the
right balance between dierent types of classication errors – false-
positive (FP) and false negative (FN) – remains a challenge. Usually,
the only “tool” available for managing this trade-o is the condence
threshold, a value in the range of [0,1] designating the level of
certainty by the classier of the le being malicious. Aside from
being a blunt instrument (small changes in this value can cause
large uctuations in detection performance), recent studies [8]
suggest that the condence score is not as reliable an indicator as
commonly assumed.
e use of reinforcement learning oers an elegant solution to
both problems. First, this type of algorithms enables practitioners to
assign clear numeric values to each classication outcome, as well
as to quantify the cost of computing resources. ese values reect
the priorities of the organization, and can be easily adapted and
rened as needed. Secondly, once these values have been set, the
reinforcement learning algorithm automatically aempts to dene
a policy (i.e., strategy) that maximizes them. is policy is likely
to reect organizational priorities much more closely than the use
of a condence threshold. Finally, since reinforcement learning
algorithms are designed to operate based on partial knowledge,
there is no need to run all detectors in advance; the algorithm
interactively selects a single detector, evaluates its performance and
then determines whether the benet of using additional detectors is
likely to be worth their computational cost. Moreover, the selection
of detectors is dynamic, with dierent detector combinations used
for dierent scenarios.
3 ASPIRE: AUTOMATED SECURITY POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION USING
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
In this research we present ASPIRE, an automated security policy
implementation using reinforcement learning. e goal of our
approach is to automatically learn a security policy that best ts
organizational requirements. More specically, we train a deep
neural network to dynamically determine when sucient infor-
mation exists to classify a given le and when more analysis is
needed. e policy produced by our approach is shaped based on
the values (i.e., rewards and costs) assigned to correct and incorrect
le classications, as well as to the use of computing resources.
We introduce a RL framework that explores the ecacy of vari-
ous detector combinations and continuously performs cost-benet
analysis to select optimal detector combinations.
e main challenge in selecting detector combinations can be
modelled as an exploration/exploitation problem. While the cost
(i.e., computing resources) of using a detector can be very closely
approximated in advance, its benet (i.e., the usefulness of the anal-
ysis) can only be known in retrospect. RL algorithms perform well
in scenarios with high uncertainty where only partial information
is available, a fact that makes them highly suitable for the task at
hand. ASPIRE’s architecture, describing the interaction between
the agent and the environment, is presented in Figure 1.
pefile
byte3g
opcode2g
manalyze
feature extraction prediction
feature extraction prediction
feature extraction prediction
feature extraction prediction
Agent
Environment
A = {manalyze, pefile, byte3g, opcode2g, benign, malicious}
a ϵ A
reward - r
new state - s’
Figure 1: ASPIRE high-level architecture
We next present the state and action-spaces used by our approach
and describe the cost/reward structure used in our experiments and
the rationale of seing dierent security policies for dierent types
of organizations.
States. e states that make up our environment consist of all
possible score combinations by the participating detectors. More
specically, for a malware detection environment consisting of
K detectors, each possible state will be represented by a vector
V = {v1,v2, ...vK }, with the value of vx being set by
vx =
{ [0, 1] if detector x has been applied
−1 otherwise (1)
erefore, the initial state for each incoming le is a vector consist-
ing entirely of -1 values. As various detectors are chosen to analyze
the les, entries in the vector are populated with the condence
scores they provide. All scores are normalized to a [0,1] range,
where a condence value of 1 indicates full certainty of the le
being a malware and 0 indicates full certainty in its being benign.
An example of a possible state vector can be seen in Figure 2.
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{-1, 0, 0.81, -1, ... , -1, 0.67, -1, 0.93} 
v1      v2         v3           v4                   vK-3        vK-2        vK-1         vK
Figure 2: Example of a state vector
Actions. e number of possible actions corresponds directly with
the number of available detectors in the environment. For an en-
vironment consisting of K detectors, the number of actions will
be K + 2: one action for the activation of each detector, and two
additional actions called “malicious” and “benign”. Each of the two
laer actions produces a classication decision for the analyzed
le, while also terminating the analysis process.
Rewards. e rewards need to be designed so that they reect the
organizational security policy, namely the tolerance for errors in
the detection process and the cost of using computing resources:
• Detection errors. We need to consider two types of er-
rors: false-positives (FP), which is the agging of a benign
le as malicious (i.e., a “false alarm”), and false-negative
(FN), which is the agging of a malicious le as benign.
In addition to the negative rewards incurred by misclassi-
cation, it is also possible to provide positive reward for
cases where the algorithm was correct. We elaborate on
this further in Section 5 and present the various scoring
schemes used in our evaluation.
• Computing resources. In this study we chose the time
required to run a detector as the approximated cost of its
activation. In addition to being a close approximator of
other types of resources use (e.g., CPU, memory), running
time is a clear indicator of an organization’s ability to
process large volumes of incoming les. To put it simply,
reducing the average time required to process a le enables
organizations to process more les with less hardware.
When designing the reward function for the analysis runtime, we
needed to address the large dierence in this measure between
various detectors. As shown in Table 2 in Section 4.2, average
running times can vary by orders of magnitude (from 0.7s to 44.29s,
depending on the detector). In order to mitigate these dierences
and encourage the use of the more “expensive” (but also more
accurate) detectors, we dene the cost function of the computing
time as follows
C(t) =
{
t if 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
min{1 + loд2(t), 6} if t > 1 (2)
It is important to note that while we only consider running time as
the computing resource whose cost needs to be taken into account,
our approach can be easily adapted to include additional resources
such as memory usage, CPU runtime, cloud computing costs and
even electricity. As such, ASPIRE enables organizations to easily and
automatically integrate all relevant costs into their decision making
process, something that has not been possible before with other
ML-based approaches.
4 DATASET MALWARE DETECTION
ANALYSIS
Our dataset consists of 24,737 PE les, equally divided between ma-
licious and benign. While we were unable to determine the creation
time of each le, all les were collected from the repositories of the
network security department of a large organization in October
2018. We analyze each le using four dierent malware detectors,
and make both the le corpus and the classication scores publicly
available.2 In the remainder of this section we rst describe the de-
tectors used in our experiments and then analyze their performance
– both in absolute terms and in relation to each other.
4.1 e Detectors
Our selection of detectors was guided by three objectives:
• O-the-shelf soware. e ability to use malware detec-
tion solution without any special adaptation demonstrates
that our approach is generic and easily applicable.
• Proven detection capabilities. By using detectors that
are also in use in real-world organizations we ensure the
validity of our experiments.
• Run-time variance. Since the goal of our experiments is
to demonstrate ASPIRE’s ability to perform cost-eective
detection (with running time being our chosen cost met-
ric), using detection solutions that vary in their resource
requirements was deemed preferable. Moreover, such vari-
ance is consistent with real-world detection pipelines that
combine multiple detector “families” [11].
Following the above-mentioned objectives, we selected four de-
tectors to be included in our dataset: pele, byte3g, opcode2g, and
manalyze.
pele. is detector uses seven features extracted from the PE
header: DebugSize, ImageVersion, IatRVA, ExportSize, Resource-
Size, VirtualSize2, and NumberOfSections, all presented in [19].
Using those features, we trained a Decision Tree classier to pro-
duce the classication.
byte3g. is detector uses features extracted from the raw binaries
of the PE le [17]. First, it constructs trigrams (3-grams) of bytes.
Secondly, it computes the trigrams term-frequencies (TF), which
are the raw counts of each trigram in the entire le. irdly, we
calculate the document-frequencies (DF), which represent the rarity
of a trigram in the entire dataset. Lastly, since the amount of fea-
tures can be substantial (up to 2563), we use the top 300 DF-valued
features for classication. Using the selected features, we trained a
Random Forest classier with 100 trees.
opcode2g. is detector uses features based on the disassembly
of the PE le [16]. First, it disassembles the le and extract the op-
code of each instruction. Secondly, it generates bigrams (2-grams)
representation of the opcodes. irdly, both the TF and DF val-
ues are computed for each bigram. Lastly, as done for byte3g, we
2Links to all materials will be provided pending acceptance.
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select the 300 features with the highest DF values. Using the se-
lected features, we trained a Random Forest classier with 100 trees.
manalyze. is detector is a based on open-source heuristic scan-
ning tool named Manalyze3. is detector oers multiple types
of static analysis capabilities for PE les, each implemented in a
separate “plugin”. In our version we included the following capabil-
ities: packed executables detection, ClamAV and YARA signatures,
detection of suspicious import combinations, detection of crypto-
graphic algorithms, and the verication of authenticode signatures.
Each plugin returns one of three values: benign, possibly malicious,
and malicious. Since Manalyze does not oer an out-of-the-box
method for combining the plugin scores, we trained a Decision
Tree classier with the plugins’ scores as features.
4.2 Detectors Performance Analysis
In this section we analyze and compare the performance of the
various detectors. We explore the eectiveness of various detector
combinations and explain why the selection of only a subset of
possible detectors is likely to produce near-optimal performance at
a much lower computational cost.
Overall detector performance. We begin by analyzing the upper
bound on the detection capability of our four detectors. In Table 1
we present a breakdown of all les in our dataset as a function of
the number of times they were incorrectly classied by the various
detectors. All detectors were trained and tested using 10-fold cross-
validation, and we present an average of the results. We dene
Incorrect classication as a condence threshold above 0.5 for a
benign le or one that is equal or smaller than 0.5 for a malicious
le.
Table 1: A breakdown of the les of our dataset based on the
number of detectors that misclassied them.
# Misclassication # Files % of Files
0 18062 73.02
1 5149 20.81
2 969 3.92
3 397 1.60
4 160 0.65
e results in Table 1 show that approximately 73% of all les are
classied correctly by all detectors, while only 0.65% (160 les) are
not detectable by any method. We derive two conclusions from
this analysis: a) Approximately ∼26.5% of the les in our dataset
potentially require that we use multiple detectors to achieve correct
classication; b) only a small percentage of les (1.6%) is correctly
classied by a single classier, which means that applying all four
detectors for a given le is hardly ever required. We argue that
these conclusions support our hypothesis that a cost-eective ap-
proach for using only a subset of possible detectors.
3hps://github.com/JusticeRage/Manalyze
Absolute and relative detector performance. Our goal in this
analysis is rst to present the performance (i.e., detection rate) of
each detector, and then determine whether any classier is dom-
inated by another (thus making it redundant, unless it is more
computationally ecient). We begin our analysis by presenting the
absolute performance of each detector. As can be seen in Table 2,
the accuracy of the detectors ranges between 82.88%–95.5%, with
the more computationally-expensive detectors generally achieving
the beer performance.
Table 2: e performance of the participating detectors. We
present overall accuracy, the true-positive (malware detec-
tion) rate and the false-positive (misclassication of benign
les) rate. In addition, we present the mean running time of
each detector, calculated over all les in the dataset. e run-
ning times were measured on machines utilizing the same
specications, detailed in Section 5.1.
Accuracy (%) TPR FPR Mean Time (sec)
manalyze 82.88 0.844 0.186 0.75
pele 90.59 0.902 0.090 0.70
byte3g 94.89 0.937 0.039 3.99
opcode2g 95.50 0.951 0.041 42.99
Next we aempted to determine whether any detector is domi-
nated by another. For each detector, we analyzed the les it mis-
classied in order to determine whether they would be correctly
classied by another detector. e results of this analysis, presented
in Table 3, show that no detector is being dominated. Moreover, the
large variance in the detection rates of other detectors for misclas-
sied les further suggests that an intelligent selection of detector
subsets – where the detectors complement each other – can yield
high detection accuracy.
Table 3: Complementary detection performance. For the de-
tectors presented in each row, we show the detection accu-
racy of the other detectors on the les it misclassied.
manalyze pele byte3g opcode2g
manalyze - 82.96% 90.09% 91.01%
pele 68.96% - 73.43% 78.93%
byte3g 66.24% 50.32% - 60.69%
opcode2g 65.71% 55.90% 55.99% -
Detectors condence score distributions. Next we analyze the
condence score distribution of the various detectors. Our goal in
this analysis is to determine whether the detectors are capable of
nuanced analysis; we hypothesize that detectors which produce
multiple values on the [0,1] scale (rather than only 0s and 1s) might
enable our DRL approach to devise more nuanced policies for se-
lecting detector combinations.
e results of our analysis are presented in Figure 3. While it
is clear that all detectors assign either 0s or 1s to the majority of
les, a large number of les (particularly for the less-expensive,
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Table 4: e running time and performance of all possible malware detector combinations
# Detector Combination Aggregation Method Mean Accuracy (%) Mean Time (sec) FP (%) FN (%)
(1) manalyze,pele,byte3g,opcode2g stacking (RF) 96.86 49.73 1.52 1.62
(2) manalyze,byte3g,opcode2g majority 96.71 49.03 1.45 1.84
(3) manalyze,pele,byte3g,opcode2g majority 96.65 49.73 1.40 1.95
(4) byte3g,opcode2g majority 96.37 48.28 1.65 1.98
(5) pele,byte3g,opcode2g majority 96.30 48.98 1.61 2.09
(6) manalyze,pele,opcode2g majority 95.98 45.74 1.77 2.25
(7) manalyze,pele,byte3g majority 95.62 5.44 1.95 2.43
(8) byte3g,opcode2g or 95.57 48.28 3.23 1.20
(9) manalyze,opcode2g majority 95.56 45.04 2.12 2.32
(10) opcode2g none 95.50 44.29 2.07 2.43
(11) pele,opcode2g majority 95.44 44.99 2.06 2.49
(12) manalyze,pele,byte3g,opcode2g stacking (DT) 95.16 49.73 2.48 2.36
(13) manalyze,byte3g majority 95.15 4.74 2.43 2.43
(14) byte3g none 94.89 3.99 1.96 3.15
(15) pele,byte3g majority 94.85 4.69 2.32 2.83
(16) pele,opcode2g or 92.99 44.99 5.81 1.19
(17) pele,byte3g or 92.83 4.69 5.55 1.63
(18) pele,byte3g,opcode2g or 92.62 48.98 6.58 0.80
(19) manalyze,pele majority 92.40 1.45 3.47 4.14
(20) pele none 90.60 0.70 4.52 4.88
(21) manalyze,opcode2g or 88.67 45.04 10.56 0.77
(22) manalyze,byte3g or 88.58 4.74 10.51 0.91
(23) manalyze,byte3g,opcode2g or 88.13 49.03 11.40 0.47
(24) manalyze,pele,opcode2g or 86.31 45.74 13.27 0.42
(25) manalyze,pele,byte3g or 86.28 5.44 13.13 0.60
(26) manalyze,pele or 86.23 1.45 12.36 1.41
(27) manalyze,pele,byte3g,opcode2g or 85.82 49.73 13.88 0.30
(28) manalyze none 82.88 0.75 9.32 7.80
less-accurate detectors) receives intermediary values. We there-
fore conclude that the classications produced by the detectors are
suciently diverse to support a nuanced DRL-policy. e ecacy
of this policy will be evaluated by our experiments, presented in
Section 5.3.
Detectors combinations performance and time consumption.
Finally, we provide a comprehensive analysis on the performance
and time consumption for all possible detector combinations, pre-
sented in Table 4. To evaluate the performance of each combination,
we aggregated the condence score using three dierent methods,
presented in [12]. e rst method, or, classies a le as malicious
if any of the participating detectors classies it as such (yields a
score of 0.5 and above). is method mostly improves the sensi-
tivity, but at the cost of higher false-positives percentage (benign
les classied as malicious). e second method, majority, uses
voting to classify the les. e third method, stacking, combines
the classication condence scores by training a ML model, with
the scores provided as its features. In our evaluation, we used two
types of classiers – Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF) –
and evaluated each using 10-fold cross-validation.
Interestingly, our analysis shows that in the case of majority,
the optimal performance is not achieved by combining all classi-
ers, but rather only three of them. Furthermore, some detector
combinations (manalyze, pele, byte3g) outperform other detector
sets while also being more computationally ecient. e results
further support our claim that an intelligent selection of detector
combinations is highly important.
It should be noted that for each le, the times were measured in
an isolated computer process on a dedicated machine to prevent
other processes interruptions. In addition, the machines execut-
ing the detectors were identical utilizing the same hardware and
rmware specications.
5 EVALUATION
To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the rst aempt
to cra a security policy by performing a cost-benet analysis that
takes into account the resources required to use various detec-
tors. In this section we evaluate the performance of our proposed
approach in several scenarios and demonstrate its eectiveness.
Moreover, we show that simple adjustments to our algorithm’s
reward function (which reects the organization’s priorities) leads
to signicant changes in the detection strategy. We argue that this
approach is more eective (and intuitive) than existing approaches.
6
                       
 P D Q D O \ ] H  F R Q I L G H Q F H  V F R U H
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
 R I
  I L
 O H
 V
                       
 S H I L O H  F R Q I L G H Q F H  V F R U H
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
 R I
  I L
 O H
 V
                       
 E \ W H  J  F R Q I L G H Q F H  V F R U H
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
 R I
  I L
 O H
 V
                       
 R S F R G H  J  F R Q I L G H Q F H  V F R U H
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
 R I
  I L
 O H
 V
Figure 3: e distribution of the les in our dataset based on condence score assigned to them by each detector.
e remainder of this section is organized as follows: we begin by
describing the environment used for running our experiments. Next,
we describe our experimental setup and evaluated scenarios. Finally,
we present the results of our evaluation and oer an analysis.
5.1 e Evaluation Environment
We used three VMware ESXi servers, each containing two process-
ing units (CPUs). Each server had a total of 32 cores, 512GB of RAM
and 100TB of SSD disk space. Two servers were used to run the
environment and its detectors, while the remaining server housed
our DRL agent. In our experiments, we deployed two detectors in
each server. is deployment seing can easily be extended to in-
clude additional detectors or replicated to increase the throughput
of existing ones. Our main goal in seing up the environment was
to demonstrate a large scale implementation which is both scalable
and exible, thus ensuring its relevance to real-world scenarios.
Figure 4 presents our infrastructure structure in detail.
Both the agent processes and the detectors run on virtual ma-
chines with the Ubuntu 18.04 LTS operating system. Each machine
has 4 CPU cores, 16GB of RAM and 100GB of SSD storage. e
agent uses a management service that allows both the training and
execution of the DRL algorithm, using dierent tuning parameters.
Upon the arrival of a le for analysis, the agent stores it in a dedi-
cated storage space, which is also accessible to all detectors running
in the environment. e agent also utilizes an external storage to
store le and detector-based features, all logging information, and
the analysis output. All this information is later indexed and con-
sumed by an analytics engine. e agent communicates with the
environment over HTTP protocol.
5.2 Experimental Setup
e following seings were used in all our experiments:
• We used 10-fold cross validation in all experiments, with
label ratios maintained for each fold. e results presented
in this study are the averages of all runs.
• We implemented the framework using Python v3.6. More
specically, we used the ChainerRL4 deep reinforcement
library to create and train the agent, while the environment
was implemented using the OpenAI Gym [4].
4hps://github.com/chainer/chainerrl
VM
VMVM VMVM
ESXi
ESXiESXi
HTTP
Agent
Environment
manalyze pefile opcode2gbyte3g
Agent
Figure 4: Experimental Setup Infrastructure Architecture
• Both the policy network and the action-value network
consist of the following architecture: input layer of size 4
(the state vector’s size), a single hidden layer of size 20 and
an output layer of size 6 (the size of the action space – four
detectors and the two possible classications). All layers
except for the output used the ReLU activation function,
while the output layer used somax.
• We set our initial learning rate to 7e − 4, with exponential
decay rate of 0.99 and a fuzz factor (epsilon) of 1e − 2. Our
chosen optimizer was RMSprop [28]. In all experiments,
our model trained until convergence.
• We set the size of the replay buer to 5000. We start using
it in the training process aer 10,000 episodes.
• In order to discourage the agent from querying the same
detector twice (which is an obvious waste of resources,
since no new information is gained), we dene such actions
to incur a very large cost of -10,000. e same “ne” applies
to aempts to classify a le without using even a single
detector.
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5.3 Experimental Results
We hypothesize that our proposed ASPIRE approach has two major
strengths: a) it can produce near-optimal performance at reduced
computational cost; and b) e use of rewards enables us to easily
dene and tune our security policies by assigning a “personalized”
set of detectors for each le.
To test the robustness of our approach, as well as its ability
to generalize, we dene ve use-cases with varying emphasis on
correct/incorrect le classications and computational cost. e
rewards composition of each use-case is presented in Table 5, along
with its overall accuracy and mean running time. It is important to
note that the computational cost of using a detector is never calcu-
lated independently, but rather as a function of correct/incorrect le
classication. Additionally, the computational costs of the malware
detectors were dened based on the average execution time of the
les we used for training. is practice enabled the algorithm to
converge faster. Our experiments show that this type of seing out-
performs other approaches for considering computational cost, as
it strongly ties the invested resources to the classication outcome.
Next we describe our ve use-cases and their rationale.
Experiment 1. In this experiment we set both the reward for cor-
rect classication and the cost of incorrect classication to be equal
to the cost of the running time. On one hand, this seing “encour-
ages” ASPIRE to invest more time analyzing incoming les and
also provides higher rewards for the correct classication of more
challenging les. On the other hand, the detector is discouraged
from selecting detector congurations that are likely to reduce its
accuracy for a given le. Additionally, our approach is not likely
to be inclined to pour additional resources into dicult-to-classify
cases where the investment of more time is unlikely to provide
additional information.
Experiment 2. is seing of this experiment is similar to that
of experiment 1, except for the fact that the cost of incorrect clas-
sications is 10x higher than the reward for correct ones. We
hypothesized that this seing will cause the algorithm to be more
risk-averse and invest additional resources in the classication of
challenging les.
Please note that experiments 1 & 2 are not designed to assign high
priority to resource eciency, but instead focus on accuracy. e
remaining experimental seings are designed to give greater pref-
erence to the ecient use of resources.
Experiments 3-5. In this set of experiments we explore policies
where the rewards assigned to correct classication are xed while
the cost of incorrect classication depend on the amount of comput-
ing resources spent to reach the classication decision. We explore
three variants of this approach, where the cost of incorrect classi-
cation remains the same but the rewards for correct classications
are larger by one and two orders of magnitude (1, 10, and 100).
is set of experiments has two main goals: rst, since only
the cost of an incorrect classication is time-dependent, we expect
experiments 3-5 to be more eciency-oriented. Our aim is to de-
termine the size of this improvement and its eect on the accuracy
of our approach. Secondly, we are interested in exploring the eect
of varying reward/cost ratios on the policy generated by ASPIRE.
Since we explore scenarios in which the reward for correct clas-
sications is either signicantly smaller or larger than the cost of
incorrect ones, our expectation was to obtain beer understanding
of ASPIRE’s decision mechanism.
Results. A summary of the results is presented in Table 5 while
a detailed breakdown of the detector combinations used by by
each of our generated DRL policies can be found in Table 6. We
present a detailed comparison of the results obtained by our various
experiments is shown in Tables 7-10.
Table 5: e cost/reward setup of our experiments. e func-
tion C(t) is presented in Equation 2.
Exp. Reward Setup Accuracy Mean
# TP TN FP FN (%) Time (sec)
1 C(t) C(t) -C(t) -C(t) 96.810 49.634
2 C(t) C(t) -10C(t) -10C(t) 96.786 49.581
3 1 1 -C(t) -C(t) 96.212 10.528
4 10 10 -C(t) -C(t) 95.424 3.681
5 100 100 -C(t) -C(t) 91.220 0.728
Table 6: Distribution of detector combination choices made
by the agent for each of our experimental policies.
Exp.
#
Acc.
(%)
Action sequences Time
(sec)
Files
(%)
1 96.81 byte3g,opcode2g,manalyze,pele 49.73 86.82
byte3g,opcode2g,manalyze 49.03 8.40
byte3g,opcode2g,pele 48.98 4.54
byte3g,opcode2g 48.28 0.24
2 96.79 opcode2g,manalyze,pele,byte3g 49.73 80.11
opcode2g,pele,byte3g 48.98 19.89
3 96.21 byte3g 3.99 83.38
byte3g,pele,opcode2g 48.98 12.67
byte3g,pele 4.69 2.15
byte3g,pele,opcode2g,manalyze 49.73 1.80
4 95.42 manalyze,byte3g,pele 5.44 50.77
manalyze,pele 1.45 22.49
manalyze 0.75 16.89
manalyze,byte3g 4.74 9.85
5 91.22 pele 0.70 96.17
pele,manalyze 1.45 3.83
Overall, the results show that ASPIRE is capable of generating
highly eective detection policies. e policies generated in experi-
ments 1-2 outperformed all the methods presented in the baseline
except for the top-performing one, which is a combination of all
classiers and the Random Forest algorithm. While this baseline
method marginally outperforms our approach (98.86% to 96.81%
and 96.79% for experiments 1 and 2 respectively), it is also slightly
more computationally expensive (49.74 seconds on average com-
pared with 49.63 and 49.58 for experiments 1 and 2 respectively).
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Table 7: e results of Experiments 1 & 2, presented along-
side the baselines that are closest to them in performance
Detector
Combination
Aggregation
Method
Mean
Acc.
(%)
Mean
Time (s)
FP
(%)
FN
(%)
(1) stacking (RF) 96.86 49.73 1.52 1.62
Experiment 1 ASPIRE 96.81 49.63 1.09 2.09
Experiment 2 ASPIRE 96.79 49.58 1.80 1.39
(2) majority 96.71 49.03 1.45 1.84
(3) majority 96.65 49.73 1.40 1.95
(4) majority 96.37 48.28 1.65 1.98
(5) majority 96.30 48.98 1.61 2.09
Table 8: e results of Experiment 3, presented alongside
the baselines that are closest to it in performance
Detector
Combination
Aggregation
Method
Mean
Acc.
(%)
Mean
Time (s)
FP
(%)
FN
(%)
(1) stacking (RF) 96.86 49.73 1.52 1.62
(2) majority 96.71 49.03 1.45 1.84
(3) majority 96.65 49.73 1.40 1.95
(4) majority 96.37 48.28 1.65 1.98
(5) majority 96.30 48.98 1.61 2.09
Experiment 3 ASPIRE 96.21 10.53 1.96 1.82
(6) majority 95.98 45.74 1.77 2.25
ese results are as we expected, since the policies we dened for
experiments 1 and 2 were geared towards accuracy rather than
eciency.
e policies generated by experiments 3-5 are more interesting,
as they each achieve a dierent accuracy/eciency balance. More-
over, each of the three policies was able to reach accuracy results
that are equal or beer to those of the corresponding baselines at a
much lower cost. e policy generated by experiment 3 reached an
accuracy of 96.21% with a mean time of 10.5 seconds, compared
with its closest baseline “neighbor” which achieved an accuracy of
96.3% in a mean time of of 48.28 seconds (almost ve time longer).
Similarly, the policy produced by experiment 4 achieved the same
accuracy as its baseline counterpart (pele,opcode2g) while requir-
ing only 3.68 seconds on average compared with the baseline’s 45
seconds – a 92% improvement. e policy generated by experiment
5 requires 0.728 seconds per le on average, which is comparable
to time required by the baseline method “pele”. Our approach,
however, achieves higher accuracy (91.22% vs 90.6%).
Analysis. Our experiments clearly demonstrate that security pol-
icy can be very eectively managed through the use of dierent
cost/reward combinations. Moreover, it is clear that the use of DRL
oers much greater exibility in the shaping of the security policy
than the simple tweaking of the condence threshold (the only
available method for most ML-based detection algorithms).
Table 9: e results of Experiment 4, presented alongside
the baselines that are closest to it in performance
Detector
Combination
Aggregation
Method
Mean
Acc.
(%)
Mean
Time (s)
FP
(%)
FN
(%)
(7) majority 95.62 5.44 1.95 2.43
(8) or 95.57 48.28 3.23 1.20
(9) majority 95.56 45.04 2.12 2.32
(10) none 95.50 44.29 2.07 2.43
(11) majority 95.44 44.99 2.06 2.49
Experiment 4 ASPIRE 95.42 3.68 1.06 3.51
(12) stacking (DT) 95.16 49.73 2.48 2.36
(13) majority 95.15 4.74 2.43 2.43
(14) none 94.89 3.99 1.96 3.15
(15) majority 94.85 4.69 2.32 2.83
Table 10: e results of Experiment 5, presented alongside
the baselines that are closest to it in performance
Detector
Combination
Aggregation
Method
Mean
Acc.
(%)
Mean
Time (s)
FP
(%)
FN
(%)
(19) majority 92.40 1.45 3.47 4.14
Experiment 5 ASPIRE 91.22 0.73 3.52 5.26
(20) none 90.60 0.70 4.52 4.88
… or … … … …
(28) none 82.88 0.75 9.32 7.80
When analyzing the behavior (i.e., the detector selection strat-
egy) of our policies, we nd that they behaved just as we could have
expected. e policies generated by experiments 1 and 2 explic-
itly favored performance over eciency, as the reward for correct
classication was also time-dependent. As a result, they achieve
very high accuracy but only a marginal improvement in eciency.
For experiments 3-5, the varying xed cost that we assigned to
the correct classications played a deciding role in creating the
policy. In experiment 3, the relative cost of a mistake was oen
much larger than reward for a correct classication. erefore, the
generated policy is cautious, achieving relatively high accuracy
(but at impressive eciency). In experiment 5, the cost of an incor-
rect classication is relatively marginal, a fact that motivates the
generated policy to prioritize speed over accuracy. e policy gen-
erated by experiment 4 oers the middle ground, reaching a slightly
reduced accuracy compared with experiment 3, but managing to
do so in about 33% of the running time.
Finally, we consider it important to elaborate on the major
strength of our approach: the ability to cra a “personalized” set of
detectors for each le. In Figure 5 we show the overall distributions
of detector combinations (represented by their running time), cho-
sen by the policies of all experiments. e dierences among the
dierent policies are clear, showing the clear connection between
rewards and policies. Experiment 4 oers an excellent use case for
this connection, as its policy utilizes multiple detector combinations
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Figure 5: Distribution of the choices made by the agent in each experiment
of varying costs. is diversity helps to explain ASPIRE’s ability
to achieve high accuracy at much smaller computational cost. It is
important to stress again that the detector combinations are not
chosen in advance. Instead, they are chosen iteratively, with the
condence score of the already-applied detectors used to guide the
next step chosen by the policy.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Malware Detection Techniques for PEs
Portable executable les can be represented in multiple ways, a
fact that has contributed to the large number of approached pro-
posed for its analysis. e most common (and simple) approach
of representing a PE le is by calculating its hash value [9]. is
method is frequently used by anti-virus engines to “mark” and
identify malware, as both computing and retrieving hashes is fast
and ecient.
Additional studies propose representing PEs using their binary
data. Wan et al. [17], for example, suggest using a dictionary of
byte n-grams (sequences of n bytes) for malware classication. e
authors examined dierent n-grams sizes ranging from three to six,
as well as three feature selection methods. ey experimented with
four types of models: articial neural network (ANN), decision tree
(DT), naı¨ve bayes (NB) and support vector machine (SVM). e
decision tree algorithm achieved the best accuracy of 94.3% with
less than 4% of false-positives.
Another type of features is generated using the disassembly of a
PE le and extracting opcode n-grams. e use of opcode n-grams
to classify malware was suggested by [16]. e authors examined
dierent sizes of n-grams ranging from three to six, as well as three
feature selection methods. To classify the les, they used several
models such as ANN, DT, Boosted DT, NB and Boosted NB. e
best results achieved by the DT and the Boosted DT models, with
more than 93% accuracy, less than 4% false-positives and less than
17% false-negatives.
Lastly, the PE format (i.e., metadata) can be used to represent the
PE le [1, 5, 19]. e format of PE les has a well-dened structure,
which includes information necessary to the execution process, as
well as some additional data (such as versioning info and creation
date). In [19], the authors used seven features extracted from the
PE headers to classify malicious les: DebugSize, ImageVersion,
IatRVA, ExportSize, ResourceSize, VirtualSize2, and NumberOfSec-
tions. e study presents the results of multiple machine learning
algorithms used for classifying the PEs: IBK, Random Forest, J48,
J48 Gra, Ridor and PART. e evaluation results show similar per-
formance for all classiers, reaching an accuracy of up-to 98.56%
and a false-positive rate as lower as 5.68%.
6.2 Reinforcement Learning in Security
Domains
Reinforcement learning is used in the security domains mainly
for adversarial learning and malware detection. In the eld of
adversarial learning, RL can be successfully used to modify malware
les as to beer avoid detection [1]. is goal was achieved by
aacking static analysis detector while equipping the agent with a
set of malicious functionality-preserving operations.
In the malware detection domain, Silver et al. [3] presented
a proof of concept for an adaptive rule-based malware detection
framework. e proposed framework employs a learning classier
systems combined with a rule-based expert system. e VirusTotal
online malware detection service served as the PE le malware
classier, using multiple static PE le feature for detection. A rein-
forcement learning algorithm was then used to determine weather
a PE is malicious.
In their paper, Mohammadkhani and Esmaeilpour [15] used RL
for classifying dierent malware types using a set of features com-
monly used by anti virus soware. A similar example in the same
domain was presented by [31] for optimizing malware detection on
mobile devices. e authors used reinforcement learning to control
the ooading rate of application traces to the security server, an op-
timization that is critical for mobile devices. e proposed solution
consisted of a deep Q-network coupled with a deep convolutional
neural network.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this research we have presented ASPIRE, a RL-based approach
for malware detection. Our approach dynamically and iteratively
assigns various detectors to each le, constantly performing cost-
benet analysis to determine whether the use of a given detector
is “worth” the expected reduction in classication uncertainty. e
entire process is governed by the organizational policy, which sets
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the rewards/costs of correct and incorrect classications and also
denes the cost of computational resources.
When compared to existing ensemble-based solution, our ap-
proach has two main advantages. First, it is highly ecient, since
easy-to-classify les are likely to require the use of less-powerful
classiers, a fact that gives us the ability to maintain near-optimal
performance at a fraction of the computing cost. As a result, it is
possible to analyze a much larger number of les without increas-
ing hardware capacity. Secondly, organizations can clearly and
easily dene and rene their security policy by explicitly seing the
costs of each element of the detection process: correct/incorrect
classication and resource use. Since the value of each outcome
is clearly quantied, organizations can easily experiment with dif-
ferent values and ne-tune the performance of their models to the
desired outcome.
In future work, we intent to explore several directions. First,
we would like to increase the number of detectors and integrate
a dynamic analysis component in our environment. e use of
dynamic analysis involves multiple challenges (for example, seing
up the required environments and their analysis) and is therefore a
challenging eld of research. Secondly, we would like to explore the
use of our approach in a transfer learning seing, where a model
trained on set of detectors is used as shorten the required training
period for other congurations.
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